The existing literature on the feasibility of reform focuses on the existence of special interests, informational asymmetries, distributional issues and economic rent preservation to explain reform failure. Active political competition can also reduce the possibilities of reform: In democratic regimes, successful implementation of reform generates asymmetric electoral gains, as voters reward the party most closely associated with reform. This generates a tradeo¤ for competitors between supporting reform for the welfare bene…ts and blocking reform to prevent electoral loses. This paper generates a simple uni…ed model which incorporates the standard explanations, as well as the e¤ect of the electoral incentives of actively competing political agents on the feasibility of reform.
Introduction
Why do governments fail to implement desirable economic reforms?
Several attempts to answer this question have hinged on three types of explanations: a) rent preservation b) asymmetry of information between voters and politicians and c) special interest groups.
This …rst set of explanations focuses on the e¤ect that a given policy has on the income of a particular group which sees its rents a¤ected by the policy either directly (Rajan 2007, Fernandez and Rodrik 1991 1 ) , or by the redistributive e¤ects that arise from the changes in the distribution of power that the reform generates (Jain and Mukand 2003 , Besley and Coate 1996 , Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a , 2000a 2 ). The second set of explanations argues that informational asymmetries between voters and politicians may prevent incumbents from pursuing optimal policies. Asymmetric information may cause the public to perceive policies with uncertain outcomes as corrupt (Mukand and Rodrik 2005, Coate and Morris 1999 3 ), or may allow politicians to get away with selecting a non-optimal policy (Coate and Morris 1995 , Mani, Majumdar and Mukand 2004 , Rogo¤ and Silbert 1988 4 ), to give continuation to projects that fell short of their expected value to delay bearing the political costs (Majumdar and Mukand 2004) or to undertake ine¢ cient policies to showcase their abilities to a¤ect their electoral chances (Hess and Orphanides 1995 , 2001 , Glaeser 2006 ). Finally, the third set of explanations argues that small homogeneous groups are more e¢ cient at working collectively to impose their desired policies, sometimes at the expense of society at large (Olson 1965) . This issue has been studied extensively by authors such as Grossman and Helpman (1994 , 1996 , 2001 6 ) and Coate and Morris (1995) . Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2005) argue that democracies may generate incentives for parties to prefer targeted redistribution rather than welfare improving public good investment. Furthermore, di¤erent electoral rules can make targeted transfers more prevalescent.
While many types of ine¢ ciencies arise in many of these model due to political competition, a fundamental source of ine¢ ciency is neglected in the lit-2 Jain and Mukand 2003 revisit Fernandez and Rodrik 1991 and argue that even when redistribution is available as an alternative to compensate economic losers, new economic conditions change the distribution of voters making some future redistribution schemes electorally impossible. Only projects that bene…t small minorities (that can be taxed) or supermajorities (in which case the chances of being both an economic and political loser are small) are successful. Besley and Coate 1998 provide a dynamic framework in which a citizen-candidate refuses to pursue projects that would change the identity of the median voter in a way that is detrimental to her. Acemoglu and Robinson 2000a, 2006a generate a framework in which the decision to introduce a new technology depends on the e¤ect that it will have on the likelihood that the current autocrat will retain power, and thus capture the rents attached to the new technology. 3 In Mukand and Rodrik (2005) , the incumbent is forced to implement proven, yet inadequate policies instead of experimenting with potentially optimal policies to avoid charges of corruption. In Coate and Morris (1999) a subsidy to a …rm might be the correct industrial policy, as suggested by endogenous growth theory, but the incumbent might choose not to do so to avoid corruption accusations. 4 In Coate and Morris (1995) a politician may bene…t a special interest group through a project of low value since it is less visible than a direct transfer, even when the direct transfer is less costly to taxpayers. In Mani, Majumdar and Mukand 2004 , the value of a project to a politician is distorted by the fact that some projects might be more visible than others to voters. In Rogo¤ and Silbert (1988) political business cycles emerge as a result of opportunistic use of …scal policy when informational asymmetries exist between the incumbent running for reelection and her constituencies.
5 Hess and Orphanides 1995, 2001 as well as Glaeser 2006 present models in which a costly and avoidable war is undertaken by the incumbent in order to showcase its military abilities and improve reelection chances.
6 Grossman and Helpman (1994) have developed a model where trade protection is ahieved by bribes to politicians from special interest groups. In Grossman and Helpman (1996) bribes from special interest groups are used to buy publicity in order to capture votes from uninformed voters. Grossman and Helpman (2001) present a systematic framework for studying the e¤ects of special interest groups on electoral outcomes and subsequently on policy choices.
erature. Reforms generate asymmetric electoral gains. When reform improves voters' conditions, political actors associated with reform get rewarded electorally. When the reform process depends on the joint action by competing political agents the reform may get blocked by the actor that does not bene…t electorally.This is a major issue in democracies, where the legislative may comprise of di¤erent parties competing over control of the executive. Even if there are economic gains for all actors from enacting reform, electoral gains are a zero sum game. Surprisingly, the e¤ects of active political competition have rarely been studied in spite of their importance in determining reform feasibility. 7 There can be several reasons for asymmetric electoral gains to arise from reform. The reform can act as a signal for the ability or level of commitment for the incumbent party, especially when the party's electoral campaign ran on reform promises. Another possibility for asymmetric political gains which is vastly studied in the literature but not present in the model, is that asymmetric distribution of economic gains can lead to an unfavorable redistribution of constituencies (Jain and Mukand 2003, Besley and Coate 1998) . Finally, reform may bene…t the party that is better prepared to either e¢ ciently implement the reform or run the government under the new regime. This is the channel through which reform generates an asymmetry in this model. There can be several reasons for one party to have greater implementation e¢ ciency. One reason is political leadership: Jones and Olken (2005) have shown empirically that leadership plays a huge role in shaping the development of a country. This can be manifested as competence or honesty, and might also be more important in times of institutional transformation and political change. Knowledgeably about the reform, perhaps from previous experience implementing the reform at a local or state level or from technical competence, could also explain e¢ -ciency di¤erentials. Alternatively a party may be more credibly committed to the reform because of ideology or political ties. Finally, an important source of di¤erences in implementation e¢ ciency could come from incumbency advantage, in which the incumbent has experience dealing with the bureaucracy that would be in charge of implementation. In that case, the value of reform may be higher when the incumbent party gets reelected.
The model is speci…ed in the following way. Voters are separated into two social classes: a rich minority and a poor majority. Each constituency is represented by a party. Parties share control of the legislative branch. There is a status quo level of institutional development. Political consensus is necessary to implement a costless reform that improves institutions. Since most models on 7 Some models have focused on the indirect e¤ect of political competition. For instance incumbents choose ine¢ cient policies to preserve powers when redistributive e¤ects of reform leads to electoral disadvantages (e.g. Besley and Coate 1998), or when reputation and asymmetrical information can cause voters to misinterpret intentions (e.g. Mukand and Rodrik 2005, Coate and Morris 1999) . Incumbents may tie their successors' hands by the impositon of regulatory (Moe 1990) or …scal restrictions (Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore 1994) . A notable exemption within the literature which actually focuses on active political competition leading to ine¢ cient outcomes is Alesina and Drazen (1991) : In their dynamic model competitive agents delay the implementation and thus compound the costs of a …scal stabilization program, as they face a war-of-attrition over who bears the costs. reform feasibility focus on economic rent preservation or informational issues, this model assumes that economic reforms are strictly welfare improving for all voters and that there is perfect information.
Political parties di¤er from one another in two ways, the constituency that they represent and their e¤ectiveness when implementing reform. This generates two sources of political advantage: class advantage, which favors the party that represents the poor and implementation e¢ ciency advantage which favors the party with the higher implementation e¢ ciency when reform is enacted. For this reason there can be incentives for parties to either endorse reforms or block reforms.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows: the benchmark is presented and solved in the next section. A lenghty discussion and several extensions to the model are presented in section 3 and a summary of results and a conclusion are presented in section 4.
Model

Voters
There are N >> 1 voters, who di¤er only in their productive ability. There are two types of voters, rich voters and poor voters. Rich voters have high productive ability, k r , and make up < 1 2 of total population; Poor voters have low productive ability, k p = k r , and make up 1 of total population, where 2 (0; 1). All voters are endowed with a unit of labor, which they inelastically supply. Total productive endowment of the economy is normalized to 1:
Voters are risk neutral, rational and forward looking. The utility of voters depends on the consumption of a public good and a private good. Voters have the following utility function:
where g denotes the production of a public good and y i determines consumption of a private good by a voter belonging to social class i 2 fp; rg. The elasticity of substitution, , and the preference weight, $, are both set equal to only to simplify exposition. The only requirements for the model to work are for ; $ 2 (0; 1). When = 0, the utility becomes Cobb-Douglass and class advantage dissapears as both parties choose = . The …rst extension to the model shows that the main result holds in the absence of class advantage. Finally if = 1, utlity becomes linear. The party of the rich choose a tax rate of 0 while the party of the poor would choose a tax rate of 1. In general terms, increasing increases class advantage ceteris paribus. Finally, $, only a¤ects the preference weights of private versus public goods for all agents, so as long as $ 2 (0; 1), agents want both public and private goods, which justi…es the existence of both public and private sectors in the model.
Private Sector Production
All voters supply labor one unit of labor inelastically. Private production by a voter of class i is:
where Z is the level of institutional development of the economy. Total private production in this economy is equal to Z.
Institutional Development
Institutional development depends on the successful enactment and implementation of a costless economic reform. There is a legislative proposal to make a welfare improving institutional reform that improves productivity. Parties choose whether to support or e¤ectively block reform. When both parties support reform, it gets enacted, otherwise it is blocked. If the reform is enacted, its e¤ects on the economy depend on the implementation e¢ ciency of the party that takes control of the executive by winning the election and implements the reform. The level of institutional development is thus:
where ' j 2 f0; 1g for j = H, L denotes the decision to support reform, 1, or e¤ectively block reform, 0, by party j and W 2 f H : L g denotes the implementation e¢ ciency level of the winner of the election for the executive branch such that H > L > 1.
Taxation and Public Sector Production
A proportion of private production is employed in the production of a public good. The production of the public sector good is solely …nanced by a linear tax on private production. Let denote the tax rate faced by voters. A voter of class i pays Y i and consumes the rest. y i = (1 )Y i . Public sector production equals total public revenue. That is,
Parties
Two political parties compete for o¢ ce. Parties are risk neutral, rational and forward looking. Parties di¤er with respect to two characteristics, implementation e¢ ciency, as discussed in the section on institutional development, and class identity. Class identity, i, refers to the social class that the party represents. Class identity determines the party's …scal preferences. Parties care about their respective constituencies'utilities and about capturing power. Parties have the following utility function:
where r denotes exogenous political rents from capturing the executive branch. It has a value of 0 when the party loses the election and R > 0 when it wins the election. 9
Reexpressing Utility Functions
The voter's utility function is reexpressed as an indirect utility function (Equation 2) in terms of .
Claim 1 The utility function is homogeneous of degree one on institutional development, Z.
Proof.
The utility can be reexpressed as:
This formulation is convenient because it explicitly shows the reform is strictly welfare improving: taxation decision is independent from institutional development and
The parties'utility function (equation 6) is reexpressed as an indirect utility function:
2.7 Timing of Events 3. Rational forward-looking voters simultaneously vote to elect the party that maximizes their expected incomes. Voting is costless and mandatory. If both parties o¤er the same level of after-tax income to a given social class of voters, then voters split their vote evenly. If the poor split their vote in half then rich individuals act as tie-breakers. If both parties o¤er the same levels of income to both social classes, then the election is decided by a fair coin toss.
4. The winning party chooses its optimal tax policy, j where j denotes the class identity of the winning party.
10
Solving the Model
The model is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It is solved backward induction. In the last stage of the game, the winning party chooses the tax rate that maximizes income to its constituents. Proof. Necessity: The …rst order condition is set equal to 0:
(1 )
. Su¢ ciency:
. It is clear from this claim that tax policy is independent from the level of institutional development and from political rents, as optimal taxation only depends (and is inversely related to) productive ability, k.
Claim 3
The rich always prefer lower taxes than the poor.
Proof. Solution is interior since
1 1+ki is open and bounded between 0 and 1 8k i > 0. The solution is decreasing in k i :
Remark 4 Given the level of institutional development, Z, i) When the party of the rich is elected, the utility levels to rich and poor voters are Z(1 + k r ) and
respectively, and ii) when the party of the poor is elected, the utility levels to rich and poor voters are Z (1+ and Z(1 + k r ) respectively.
Stage 3. Electing a Candidate
At this point voters have observed: whether the reform was enacted, and the implementation e¢ ciencies and class identities of both parties. Therefore, voters can perfectly infer their expected payo¤ from electing either party. They elect the party that maximizes their expected utility.
11 Let Z j denote the level of institutional development that arises when a party of identity j is elected. The poor compares her utility when the party of the poor and the party of the rich are elected and chooses the one that maximizes her utility. The poor only vote for the party of the rich if the expected utility from electing the rich is greater (or equal) to the expected utility they get from election the poor, that is, if
This equation can be reexpressed as:
Claim 6 Poor voters only vote for the party of the rich if the reform is enacted and the party of the rich has an level of implementation e¢ ciency su¢ cient to o¤ set the di¤ erences in …scal policies, that is if
Proof. It follows from comparing the utility levels under each party (i.e. equation (12)).
To help exposition, it is important to explore the di¤erent possibilities under which equation (12) fails to hold.
Remark 7 i) Z r = 1 occurs only when reform is blocked. ii) if Z r 2 (1; Z p ] then reform was enacted and party of the rich is the low e¢ ciency party and iii) when Z r 2 (Z p ; Z elect ) although the party of the rich is the high e¢ ciency and although the reform has been enacted, the e¢ ciency di¤ erentials are insu¢ cient to o¤ set the di¤ erences in …scal policies.
Case iii) shows the situation where classadvantage dominates e¢ ciency advantage. It is important o distinguish the di¤erent cases, as they a¤ect the incentives parties face whn choosing whether to support or block reform.
Stage 2. Supporting or Blocking Reform
Both parties choose whether to support or block the reform. For the high e¢ ciency party, the decision is trivial. The reform raises the overall welfare of voters. It also increases its opportunities of getting elected, which bene…ts it both directly through political rents and indirectly through the e¤ect on …scal policy. For the low e¢ ciency party, the decision involves a tradeo¤: reform can improve welfare of its constituents but it can make constituents vote for the high e¢ ciency party if reform gains are greater than …scal loses. When the electoral losses are less or equal to the economic gains, parties suport reform.
Claim 8 The party of the rich always supports reform (i.e. supporting is always a weakly best strategy for the party of the rich).
Proof. When Z r 2 (1; Z p ], if both parties support, the party of the poor wins the election and the payo¤ for the party of the rich is U ( p ; k r ; H ). When Z r 2 (Z p ; Z elect ), if both parties support then the party of the poor wins and the payo¤ to the party of the rich is U ( p ; k r ; L ). Finally, when Z r Z elect if both parties support, the party of the rich wins the election and its payo¤ is U ( r ; k r ; H ) + R. Just by plugging the respective Z and it is trivial to show that
if the party of the poor's expected best response is to support reform, it is also the best response for the party of the rich. If the party of the poor's expected best response is blocking, the party of the rich gets U ( p ; k r ; 1) regardless of its strategy and is therefore indi¤erent (or weakly prefers) between support and blocking reform. The only case in which any party would block a strictly welfare improving reform is if reform is detrimental to the party electorally. It follows from claim 7 that reform is a necessary condition for electing the party of the rich, so it has no electoral incentives to oppose it. The interesting question then becomes: When does the party of the poor support or block reform?
If reform leads to success for the party of the rich, the party of the poor must be compensated for the loss of the election in order to support reform. For that reason, whenever equation (12) holds, the party of the poor may have an incentive to block unless:
which can be reexpressed as:
The party of the poor blocks reform whenever Z r 2 [Z elect ; Z enact ) and supports reform otherwise.
Proof. Whenever Z r < Z elect , equation (12) fails so by claim 6 the poor vote for the party of the poor, and the party of the poor supports reform to improve e¢ ciency (i.e. (12) holds so by claim 6 the poor vote for the party of the rich and since Z r Z enact , U ( t ; k r ; Z r ) V ( p ; k r ; Z r ; R). Finally, when Z enact > Z r Z elect supporting reform would lead to the party of the poor losing the election by equation (12) 
so it is optimal for the party of the poor to block reform.
This remark follows from setting Z enact Z elect and solving for R. From this remark it becomes clear that the low e¢ ciency party only blocks reform whenever the party of the poor has lower implementational e¢ ciency and political rents are su¢ ciently high to entice opportunistic behavior by the low e¢ ciency party. Let R denote the minimum level of political rents under which there is opportunistic behavior by the party of the poor.
From the previous discussion, the central proposition of the paper is constructed.
Equilibria of the Model
Proposition 11 There can emerge di¤ erent political equilibria:
A. When the party of the poor has the higher implementation e¢ ciency, H , the party of the poor wins the election and the reform gets implemented, leading to the highest e¢ ciency level.
Ba. When the party of the poor has the lower implementation e¢ ciency, L , if R > R there can be up to three di¤ erent outcomes: i) Whenever H 2 ( L ; Z elect ), the party of the poor wins the election, as e¢ ciency di¤ erencials are insu¢ cient to o¤ set …scal policy di¤ erentials. The reform gets implemented by the low e¢ ciency party.
ii) Whenever H Z enact the party of the rich wins the election as e¢ ciency di¤ erentials are su¢ cient to entice the poor to vote for the party of the rich and e¢ ciency gains are su¢ cient to o¤ set political and …scal losses for the party of the poor.
iii) Whenever H 2 [Z elect ; Z enact ) the party of the poor opportunistically blocks a reform that would allow the rich to get elected. Consequently, there is no reform and the party of the poor wins the election.
Bb. the party of the poor has the lower implementation e¢ ciency, L , if R R there can be up to two di¤ erent outcomes: i) Whenever H 2 ( L ; Z elect ), the party of the poor wins the election, as e¢ ciency di¤ erencials are insu¢ cient to o¤ set …scal policy di¤ erentials. The reform gets implemented by the low e¢ ciency party.
ii) Whenever H Z elect the party of the rich wins the election as e¢ ciency di¤ erentials are su¢ cient to entice the poor to vote for the party of the rich and e¢ ciency gains are su¢ cient to o¤ set political and …scal losses for the party of the poor.
Proof. Omitted. The proof follows from direct application of claims 6, 8 and 9 and remark 10.
It is important to understand how di¤erent parameters a¤ect the feasibility of reform. When equation (12) fails there is no incentive to block reform, as there are no electoral costs attached to reform. This case is analogous to either a dictatorship or to a regime where there is a majoritarian or monopolistic control of electoral outcomes: in this example, the party of the poor has both an e¢ ciency and a class identity advantage which makes it electorally invulnerable.
The interesting solutions arise when equation (12) holds. What a¤ects the possibilities of having a party opportunistically block reform? By simple manipulation of equation (14) it can be shown that holding the high e¢ ciency level, H , and political rents, R, constant, a smaller di¤erential in e¢ ciency levels (i.e. a higher L ) reduces the area over which reform is blocked. The intuition is that increasing L increases the area over which the di¤erential in abilities is insu¢ cient to o¤set the di¤erences in …scal policies. Conversely, increases in either income, k r , or reductions of inequality (increases in ) reduce the area over which reform is blocked. This happens because increasing or k r raises the marginal economic bene…t from reform for the party of the poor.
Discussion and Extensions
The crucial assumption in the model is the existence of e¢ ciency di¤erentials between parties in implementing reform. It acts as the mechanism through which electoral asymmetries arise from reform.
Implementation E¢ ciency and Political Asymmetries
There can be many reasons for implementation e¢ ciency di¤erences to exist. The party might have experience pushing similar reforms. Consider the case where the leader of the party comes from a background of implementing a similar policy at the local level. Alternatively we could consider an incumbency advantage. In this case, the party might have better knowledge as to how to operate the bureaucracy. Or it might have appointed some of the bureaucrats that would stay once the reform gets implemented even after its term. For example, monetary authorities may be more politically insulated than other bureaucrats if their expertise and reputation brings market reassurance and stability. Implementation e¢ ciency advantage might also arise if a party has done extensive research concerning the expected value of the reform. Finally, the pro…le of the party leadership or the party ideology might be more appropriate for implementing a given reform.
There is an equally interesting explanation which focuses on reputation rather than e¢ ciency or experience as sources of asymmetric electoral gains when reform is implemented. After that party captures executive control, voters assess its performance on whether reforms were successfully enacted and implemented. If the opposition is able to block these policies or render them either ine¤ective or costly, it hurts voters' assessment of the incumbent's performance: Successful implementation translates into high political gains for the incumbent. This generates incentives for the opposition to block reform. This behavior could explain the reform paralysis that Mexico has faced since 1997 when the party in power lost majority control of Congress. President Clinton also experienced a similar situation when failure to implement his ambitious health reform program lead the Democratic Party to lose a Congressional majority in the midterm elections during his …rst term.
There might also be issues about timing. Having an economic bene…t for voters that materializes after the election based on the electoral outcomes forces voters to reward a party for reform. While this assumption might be debatable, it allows us to deal with a complex dynamic problem in a static framework, much akin to the often employed assumption about political parties that act in the interest of voters in the last stage of a …nite-stage model. We should also ask whether it is reasonable to believe that reform proposals are pushed right before an election takes place? In reality, the timing might be more nuanced, but in competitive political regimes, there is always an election in sight, so it is not a bad assumption. Furthermore, many reforms, especially major ones (e.g. education, energy, …scal, labor, etc.) take some time to implement and survive the administrations that …rst enacted and implemented them. The timing of events, however, raises interesting empirical questions about the timing of policy reforms, which lie outside of the scope of this paper: Is it harder to push for reform in countries with a more frequent electoral cycles? What are the implications for reform in the life-cycle of an administration: Is it easier to push for reform earlier in the term, during the so-called "Honeymoon period"? Does successful policy implementation lead to early election recalls by parliamentary leaders wishing to attain higher independence from coalition parties? A second important issue with respect to the timing of events concerns the assumption that …scal policy is decided solely by the winner of the election.
Fiscal Policy
Allowing the …scal decision to arise in the last stage allows us to study class advantage, which makes results more interesting by allowing voters to make decisions based on a tradeo¤ between class advantage and implementation e¢ -ciency. On the other hand, some readers might …nd this assumption objectable. The …rst concern might be that in democracies with strong legislative branches, the taxation policies of the executive is subject to approval by the legislative. The counterargument would be that even within the restrictive set of …scal rules that a legislative imposed on the executive there might be di¤erences in …scal policies. For instance, a party representing the poor might use tax proceeds for projects that bene…t the poor disproportionately, like in building elementary schools in poor neighborhoods. The party of the rich, on the other hand, might reduce social programs to …nance the introduction of technological infrastructure which might increase the productivity of capital or to subsidize programs targeted towards the rich like tertiary education (e.g. Fernandez and Rogerson 1995) or export subsidy programs. Alternatively, executive from di¤erent parties might target …scal law selectively. A party representing the rich might prosecute black markets while a party representing the poor might focus on corporate evasion. So even under the most restrictive scenario, the actual value of …scal policies might di¤er across parties. A second reason why parties might deviate from a Downsian equilibrium …scal policy is the existence of multiple policy issues (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2001). Furthermore, the choice of o¤-center political or …scal stances might be justi…ed as strategic deterrants of new entry into the political arena (Rubinchik and Weber 2005) . Even then it is interesting to see how relaxing the assumption of …scal divergence a¤ects the results. Fiscal convergence can be achieved if either a) the …scal preferences of voters converge (e:g: = 0 or $ = f0; 1g, b) both parties cater to the same constituency or if c) the tax rate is …xed institutionally.
Extension 1: Fixed Fiscal Policy
Without loss of generality it is assumed that the tax rate is …xed institutionally,
12 Parties only compete on implementation e¢ ciency. A small change in notation is used to ease exposition. Let k L and k H denote the earning ability of the social class that the low and high e¢ ciency parties represent (e.g. if the party of the poor is the high e¢ ciency party, then k L = k r and k H = k r ).
The timing of events is as follows:
In period 1, nature determines the tax rate, b , as well as the implementation e¢ ciencies and class identities of the parties. In period 2, parties simultaneously decide whether to enact or block reform. In period 3, the election takes place. In period 4 the winner implements reform if it was enacted in period 2.
Claim 12 When no reform takes place, voters elect each party with probability 1 2 . When reform takes place, the high e¢ ciency party is elected.
Proof. Since the tax rate is …xed, U (b ; k i ; Z) = ZU (b + (1 b )k i ) for i = fp; rg regardless of the class identity of the party. Since Z = 1, under each party when reform is blocked which makes all voters indi¤erent, and equal to H and L under the high e¢ ciency and low e¢ ciency parties respectively. Since H > L , voters prefer, and thus vote for the party with high e¢ ciency.
1 2 These are all multiple points of equilibria for taxation if changes to the tax policy require agreement from both the party of the rich and the party of the poor: Recall that voters have single peaked preferences with respect to taxation. Now suppose that the status quo rate is below (above) the range [ r ; p ]. In that case, increases (decreases) in taxation to point r ( p ) would represent Paretto improvements. If on the other hand, taxation was within the range [ r ; p ] the party of the rich (poor) would not agree to any increases (decreases).
This claim is the analogous to claim 6 in the benchmark when class advantage disappears and presents the voters' behavior. Since class advantage has disappeared, each party can get elected with equal probabilities in the absence of reform. Reform enactment, tilts electoral outcomes in favor of the high ef…ciency party. The decision to support by the low e¢ ciency party depends on whether the utility from supporting reform and losing is greater than the utility from blocking reform and winning with probability
This equation is analogous to claim 9 in the benchmark. The main di¤erence between claim 9 and this equation is that now the identity of the party willing to block is no longer limited to the low ability party. Since there is no longer class advantage, any party can win the election, the low e¢ ciency has electoral incentives to block reform regardless of its class identity.
Claim 13
The high e¢ ciency party always supports.
Proof. If the best response for the low e¢ ciency party is to support reform, then the payo¤ for the high e¢ ciency party when it supports reform is
, which is the expected utility it gets when it blocks reform. When the best response for the low e¢ ciency is to block then the high e¢ ciency party weakly prefers (or is indi¤erent) between supporting and blocking.
This claim is analogous to claim 8. The decision for the high e¢ ciency party is trivial, since it can only bene…t from reform (both electorally and in terms of economic e¢ ciency) it always supports reform.
From the previous claims, a central proposition can be contructed.
Equilibria Under a Fixed Tax Rate
Proposition 14 When class advantage is suppressed, there can emerge the following political equilibria: A. If the party of the poor has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes:
, the party of the poor gets elected and reform is implemented by the party of the poor, who has the high level of e¢ -ciency.
A.ii) When R > 2 H (b + (1 b )k r ), each party gets elected with probability 1 2 , and reform is blocked by the party of the rich. B. If the party of the rich has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes:
, the party of the rich gets elected and reform is implemented by the party of the rich, who has the high level of e¢ ciency.
A.ii) When R > 2 H (b +(1 b ) k r ), each party gets elected with probability 1 2 , and reform is blocked by the party of the poor.
Proof. Omitted. It follows from direct application of claims 12 and 13, and equation (15). There are two main di¤erences with respect to the benchmark. 1) When the party of the poor is of low e¢ ciency, it cannot suport reform and win the election. Incentives to block are enhanced due to political competition. On the other hand, there is no longer a …scal cost attached to reform as both parties choose the same …scal policy. 2) the party of the rich can still win the election even if it is a low e¢ ciency party, if it chooses to block reform. For that reason, the party of the rich may act opportunistically, in contrast to the benchmark, where only the party of the poor has incentives to opportunistically block reform. Curiously enough, if each party has the same possiblities of being high e¢ ciency, the party of the poor is still more likely to act opportunistically, since a higher proportion of its utility depends on political rents. In general terms, closer competition between the two parties reduces reform feasibility by making implementation e¢ ciency a major electoral determinant.
This analysis leads to an interesting question: How is political behavior a¤ected if reform support can be negotiated in exchange for changes in tax policy?
Extension 2: Institutional Reform, Fiscal Reform and Logrolling
In order to keep the analysis simple, the high e¢ ciency party proposes an institutional reform to which the low e¢ ciency party responds by proposing a change the …scal policy from b to which the high e¢ ciency party can accept or reject.
The timing of events is as follows: In period 1, nature decides the status quo …scal policy, b , the class identities and implementation e¢ ciencies of the parties. In period 2, the high e¢ ciency party proposes an institutional reform to the low e¢ ciency party. In period 3, the low e¢ ciency party can either condition approval of the institutional reform to the approval of a new …scal policy or it can block the institutional reform. In period 4 the high e¢ ciency party decides whether to accept the o¤er. In period 5 voters observe whether reform was enacted and vote. In period 6 reform gets implemented by the winner of the election if it was enacted.
The game is solved by backward induction. Although …scal policy can be changed, both parties are still constitutionally constrained in the …scal choice. Consequently, claim 12 still holds: if reform is enacted, the voters elect the high e¢ ciency party. When there is no reform, the voters are indi¤erent and each party has a 1 2 probability of getting elected. In period 4, the high e¢ ciency has observed whether the low e¢ ciency party has proposed a …scal policy, , in exchange for support for the institutional reform. If the low e¢ ciency party has blocked reform, the election takes place and payo¤s are realized. When the low e¢ ciency party has proposed a …scal reform, it follows from claim 12 that if the high e¢ ciency party accepts the o¤er, it wins the election. For that reason, the high e¢ ciency party compares the political and e¢ ciency bene…ts of reform to the …scal consessions it has to make in order to ensure reform. That is, it compares its expected utility levels under each alternative and accepts the low e¢ ciency party's o¤er when
In period 3, the decision for the low e¢ ciency party depends on whether it can …nd a …scal policy which maximizes its utility, subject to the high e¢ ciency party still accepting. The low e¢ ciency party, therefore solves the following program:
and 2 r ; p (constraint 3) where the …rst constraint is a reexpression of equation (16) and states that the o¤er must be acceptable for the high e¢ ciency and the second constraint states that the bene…t from the …scal bene…t, along with the e¢ ciency gains from reform must at least o¤set the electoral loss from supporting reform. The third constraint is redundant, as no party would ever choose a rate outside that range, but helps interpret the solution set.
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In order to understand the mechanics of this program it helps to recall how changing taxation a¤ects utility.
Remark 15 Notice that each party represents one social class and any equilibrium …scal policy lies between r ; p . It follows from claims 1 and 2 that if
For that reason, when the low e¢ ciency party represents the rich (poor), it reduces (increases) taxation until either the …rst or third constraint binds.
From the following remark and the constraints one can construct the solution to the program.
Solution 16 i) Whenever the low ability party represents the rich, it reduces until the point where either constraint 1 or constraint 3 binds. If at that level, constraint 2 holds, then a solution is found, if constraint 2 does not hold, then there is no solution to the problem and the party simply blocks reform. ii) Whenever the low ability party represents the poor, it increases until the point where either constraint 1 or constraint 3 binds. If at that level, constraint 2 still holds, then a solution is found, if constraint 2 does not hold, then there is no solution to the problem and the party simply blocks reform.
From the previous remark and solution, a central proposition can be constructed.
Equilibria Under Fiscal and Institutional Logrolling
Proposition 17 When there is …scal and institutional logrolling, there can emerge the following political equilibria:
A. If the party of the poor has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes: A.i) When 9 a such that both constraints 1 and 2 hold, then a) if at r constraint 1 still holds, the party of the rich o¤ ers support for reform in exchange for a tax rate of = r , b) if at r constraint 1 fails, the party of the rich selects tax rate = such that solves U ( ; k r ; H )+ R 2 = U (b ; k r ; 1). The party of the poor always accepts the …scal logrolling o¤ er, wins the election and implements reform e¢ ciently.
A.ii) When @ a such that constraints 1 and 2 hold, the reform is opportunistically blocked by the party of the rich, each party wins the election with a 1 2 probability.
B. If the party of the rich has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes: B.i) When 9 a such that both constraints 1 and 2 hold, then a) if at p constraint 1 still holds, the party of the poor o¤ ers support for reform in exchange for a tax rate of = p , b) if at p constraint 1 fails, the party of the poor selects tax rate = such that solves U ( ; k r ; H ) + R 2 = U (b ; k r ; 1). The party of the rich always accepts the …scal logrolling o¤ er, wins the election and implements reform e¢ ciently.
B.ii) When @ a such that constraints 1 and 2 hold, the reform is blocked and each party wins the election with a 1 2 probability. Proof. Omitted, it follows directly from claim 12 and solution 16.
While these results seem very similar to those in the previous extension, there are two very important di¤erences. Logrolling allows the low ability party to be compensated for its losses sometimes, so it reduces the area under which reform fails, and therefore improves e¢ ciency. Logrolling on the other hand has its disadvantages, as it may lead to opportunistic behavior by the high e¢ ciency party.
Proposition 18 a) When logrolling occurs and constraint 1 binds, the high e¢ ciency party is opportunistically supporting a logrolling o¤ er that hurts its constituents. Alternatively when logrolling occurs, and constraint 1 does not bind, the high ability party may or may not be opportunistically supporting a logrolling o¤ er that hurts its constituents.
which is the utility that the constituents would get in the absence of reforms. ii) When constraint 1 is not binding, (i.e. when = r when the part of the poor is high e¢ ciency and = p when the party of the rich is high e¢ ciency) then U ( ; k H ; H ) + R 2 > U (b ; k H ; 1), which may occur either when U ( ; k H ; H ) 2 [U (b ; k H ; 1) R 2 ; U (b ; k H ; 1)) in which case the constituents are hurt by logrolling or when U ( ; k H ; H ) U (b ; k H ; 1) in which case they bene…t from logrolling.
The interesting di¤erence with respect to the benchmark is that when logrollings is present, the high e¢ ciency party, may be induced into opportunistic behavior by agreeing to an undesirable …scal policy in exchange for the electoral bene…ts from reform.
Another point to discuss is the e¤ect of informational asymmetries.
Informational Issues
In contrast with models that require informational asymmetries to justify ine¢ -cient policies, even under perfect information, politicians still block good policies for political reasons. Uncertainty gives more credence to the story: Suppose that parties have conducted research on the potential bene…ts and costs of a given reform. If voters believe that one party has better chances of successfully implementing reform, asymmetrical political gains arise. Since information is private, the low e¢ ciency party might underestimate the value of the reform, while the high e¢ ciency party might overestimate them. In order to study the e¤ects of uncertainty and informational asymmetry, a very simple extension is presented in which uncertainty and informational asymmetry are added to a …xed tax speci…cation. 
Extension 3: Informational Asymmetries
The tax rate is …xed as in the …rst extension of the model. There is an institutional reform with uncertain outcomes: if reform is successful then the level of institutional e¢ ciency increases to Z S > 1. If it fails, the level of institutional e¢ ciency becomes Z F < 1. The probability of success depends on which party gets elected, as they are in charge of implementation. The high e¢ ciency party has a probability of successful implementation equal to q H while the low e¢ -ciency party has a probability q L . Voters are risk neutral. Voters can correctly observe which party is the high e¢ ciency party, but not the actual values of q H and q L .
The timing of events is as follows: 1) Nature determines the identities and abilities of parties. Parties observe q H , q L , Z S and Z F . Voters observe Z S and Z F and know that q H > q L . 2) Parties support or block reform, reform gets enacted if both parties support it. 3) Voters observe whether reform is enacted and elect a party to government. 4) The winner implements reform if it was enacted.
Since there is no class advantage, claim 12 holds: successful enactment of reform leads to electoral success and reform inplementation by the high e¢ ciency party.
In terms of e¢ ciency, reform should be enacted if
Parties compare their expected utility when reform is enacted and when it fails in order to decide whether to support or block reform,. The expected value of an enacted reform for the high ability is E[Z]U (b ; k H ; 1) + R as it wins the election versus U (b ; k H ; 1) + R 2 where it wins the election with a probability 1 2 . For the low ability party, when reform is enacted, expected utility is
when it is not. As a result, the high ability party supports reform when
and the low ability party supports reform when
Remark 19 It follows from equations (18), (19) and (20) that support for reform by the high ability party is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for reform to be desirable. Reform desirability is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the low ability party to support it. Support from the low ability is a su¢ cient condition for the reform to be desirable and enacted.
Consequently, the solution set can be constructed from equation (20).
Equilibria Under Informational Asymmetries
Proposition 20 When class advantage is suppressed and informational asymmetries arise, there can emerge the following political equilibria: A. If the party of the poor has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes:
R the party of the poor gets elected and reform is implemented by the party of the poor, who has the high level of e¢ ciency.
A.ii) When 2(E[Z] 1)U (b ; k r ; 1) < R, each party gets elected with probability 1 2 , and reform is blocked by the party of the rich. B. If the party of the rich has higher e¢ ciency, there can be two outcomes:
R, the party of the rich gets elected and reform is implemented by the party of the rich, who has the high level of e¢ ciency.
A.ii) When 2(E[Z] 1)U (b ; k r ; 1) < R each party gets elected with probability 1 2 , and reform is blocked by the party of the rich. Proof. Omitted: It follows from claim 12 and remark 19.
The low e¢ ciency party tends to over-block reform, while the high e¢ ciency party tends to over-support. It is important to understand when the outcomes are ine¢ cient.
Remark 21
The high e¢ ciency party may unsuccessfully try to opportunistically support bad reforms (i.e. when
; 0]) but it is preempted by the low e¢ ciency party. The low e¢ ciency party, on the other hand can successfully block good reforms opportunistically (i.e. when
This is an unexpected consequence of checks and balances.
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This extension uncovers another source of opportunistic behavior. The main di¤erence with the benchmark is that voters cannot tell whether the high ability party opportunistically supporting an undesirable reform or whether the low e¢ ciency party is opportunistically blocking a desirable reform from being enacted. Uncertainty and informational asymmetries present a jusi…cation why parties may get away with blocking bene…cial reform without getting punished by constituents within a repetitive game.
Another justi…cation for unpunished opportunistic blockage of reform has to do with concentration of political power, and is implicitly assumed in this model. When there are limited political actors due to high levels of entry, voters face limited options. If voters have preferences that depend on both the "moral character" of a party or candidate and its policies, voters are forced into accepting "character ‡aws" as long as the policies are su¢ ciently similar to those those of the voters.
The other main factors through which political competition and reform ine¢ ciencies have been linked are rent expropriation and special interest groups.
Rent Preservation and Special Interest Groups
Rent preservation is perhaps the most popular explanation for reform failure. When reform leads to economic losses by some groups in society, these may oppose reform. An example of a reform leading to asymmetric economic gains and losses is the reduction of trade barriers (e.g. Rodrik and Fernandez 1991, Jain and Mukand 1996) . In that case the protected sector may vote against reform due to potential losses.
In the context of this model, since the di¤ering groups are the rich and the poor on could think of many reforms that bene…t the rich at the expense of the poor. For example, the adoption of new technologies may create a skill bias which hurts unskilled labor. Alternatively, liberalization of the labor market through immigration reform could reduce unskilled labor's real wages by increasing supply. Other reforms bene…t the poor at the expense of the rich. For example if oligopolistic pro…ts arise due to regulatory and institutional rules that discourage competition and innovation, regulation changes would bene…t consumers at the expense of the oligopolist. Many of the privatization of the 1990's led to the establishment of rich oligopolists in developing countries in sectors such as telecommunications, energy and construction materials. Rules to limit the power of oligarchs in strategic sectors would bene…t consumers.
Two sources of ine¢ ciencies dealing with rent preservation have been identi…ed in the literature: potentially bene…cial reforms may be bloced if they hurt the pivotal decisionmaker (either directly as in Rodrik and Fernandez 1991 or indirectly by a¤ecting voter's distribution as in Jain and Mukand 1996 and Besley and Coate 1998) . Alternatively, reform may be blocked if it hurts small groups which might face di¤erent organizational incentives than large constituencies. Small, homogeneous groups are more e¢ cient at solving collective action problems than large heterogenous groups: small size makes enforceability easier while homogeneity leads to converging incentives and large concentration of bene…ts (Olson 1965 (Olson , 1982 (Olson , 2000 . Consequently special interest groups, may utilize their organizational ability to grant either pecuniary or political bene…ts to political parties. These types of explanations have been studied in the context of trade protection (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1996) and the undertaking of ine¢ cient public projects (Coate and Morris 1995).
Extension 4: Rent Preservation and Special Interest Groups
In contrast with the previous extensions, class identity matters, so the tax rates, are decided by each party to cater to thier respective constituencies. The benchmark speci…cation is thus employed with two minor changes: 1) Reforms now become costly and costs are borne by one of the social classes and 2) rich voters are allowed to form special interest groups which may bribe either party in order to get their desired policy enacted.
In order to study the e¤ects of rent preservation, reform has costs that are borne by one of the groups. The interesting results arise when the costs are explicitly larger than any e¢ ciency or …scal gains the group might obtain. For that reason it is assumed that:
where i denotes the identity of the social class that bears the costs and is subtracted from the utility for the group and the party of identity i. The other group bears no costs from reform.
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The model is studied in the context of no special interest groups and under the possibility of the rich forming a special interest group. 17 Whenever rich voters can organize to form a special interest group, they can decide on a level b j to be subtracted from their utility level in order to increase the utility level of party j by N (b j ) such that 0 ( ) > 0.
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Timing of events is as follows: 1) Class identities and implementation e¢ -ciency levels are realized and observed by all agents in the economy. The identity of the cost bearers from reform is realized and observed, as well as whether rich voters can organize and o¤er a bribe to one of the parties in order to a¤ect its decision concerning reform. 2) When the rich are able to organize, the rich may o¤er a bribe to one of the parties in order to induce support or opposion to reform. 3) Both parties simultaneously choose whether to support or block reform. If the party that is o¤ered the bribe decides to accept the bribe o¤er, it simmultaneously accepts the bribe and chooses the policy that rich voters prefer.
19 4) Voters observe whether the reform was enacted and elect the party that maximizes their expected utility. 5) The winner of the election implements the reform if it was enacted. This game is solved by backward induction. There are three main parameters over which cases di¤er: the class identity of the high e¢ ciency party, the class identity of the social group that bears the costs and whether there are special interest groups (i.e. whether the rich can organize e¤ectively to bribe the parties).
For ease of exposition, each combination of class identity of high e¢ ciency party and class identity of cost bearer are studied individually. Additionally, the e¤ects of the existence of a special interest group are discussed at the end of each of the four cases. After all cases have been presented, a general statement discusses all the possible equilibria.
Case 1: The High E¢ ciency Party Represents the Rich, The
Rich are Hurt by Reform
It follows from equation (21), that rich voters always oppose reform, so if they form a special interest group, it is employed to block reform. Let us focus on the last stage of the game.
Claim 22 When no reform takes place, the party of the poor gets elected, when reform takes place, the party of the rich gets elected.
Proof. It follows from comparing the utility of poor voters under each party, U ( p ; k p ; 1) > U ( r ; k p ; 1). The second part of the statement follows from equation (21): Since U ( p ; k r ; 1) > U ( r ; k r ; H ) + c r > U ( p ; k r ; L ) + c r , the party of the rich only supports reform when it leads to its electoral success i.e.
The di¤erence with the benchmark at this stage is that the solution where the low ability party implements is not available. The reason is that since reform hurts the rich, the party of the rich may only accept reform if it leads to electoral gains which o¤set reform costs. For that reason, if e¢ ciency di¤erentials are insu¢ icient to make poor voters elect the party of the rich, it has no incentives to ever support reform.
Claim 23 A necessary condition for reform to be enacted is for i)
Proof. ii) By contradiction, assume equation ii) does not hold. In that case, the party of the poor gets elected when reform takes place. Using equation (21) is can be shown that U ( p ; k r ; L ) c r < U ( p ; k r ; L ) c r < U ( p ; k r ; 1), thus the party of the rich blocks reform. Electoral success for the party of the rich is therefore a necessary condition for reform feasibilty. Assuming reform gets the party of the rich elected, reform gets enacted only when the expected utility from supporting is greater than blocking for both parties. The left part of equation i) is directly derived from the utility comparisons for the party of the poor of supporting reform and losing election blocking reform and winning election whereas the right part is directly derived from the utility comparisons for the party of the rich of supporting the costly reform and winning the election versus blocking reform and losing the election.
Thte …rst part of the statement argues that the economic bene…ts from reform for the party of the poor need to outweight the electoral cost, while the electoral bene…ts to the party of the rich must o¤set the economic costs from reform, the second part of the statement argues that the poor must prefer the party of the rich in order for the reform to take place.
Claim 24
If there are special interest groups, reform may be blocked whenever 9
Furthermore, when such b exists, the rich bribe the party of the poor if U ( r ; k p ; H ) U ( p ; k p ; 1) R < U ( r ; k r ; H ) c r + R U ( p ; k r ; 1) and the party of the rich otherwise.
Proof.
A bribe is possible whenever it is costlier to bear the costs of reform than to bribe a party into blocking reform. It follows from claim 22 that whenever reform is blocked the party of the poor wins, therefore, the rich know that they can block reform if there is a bribe under which either party is indi¤erent between blocking and supporting such that the payo¤s to the rich are greater than allowing reform.
Remark 25 If a bribe is possible, then the rich choose to bribe the party of the poor if U ( r ; k p ; H ) U ( p ; k p ; 1) R < U ( r ; k r ; H ) c r + R U ( p ; k r ; 1) and the party of the rich otherwise.
The rich want to minimize their bribe burden, so they choose the cheapest party to bribe.
The solution set for this case can be constructed from claims 22, 23 and 24 and remark 25.
There are three interesting di¤erences which emerge in this extension: 1) the party of the rich may opportunistically support a reform that hurts its constituents in order to get elected. 2) Rich voters may either have to bribe their own party or make an unlikely alliance with the party of the poor to prevent reform. 3) When the party of the poor accepts the bribe, it is acting against the best interests of its constituents as well. In this case, it follows from equation (21) that the party of the poor always wants to block reform since U p ; k p ; 1 + R > fU p ; k p ; L + R c p , U ( r ; k p ; H ) c p g. It is also clear that both the rich and the party of the rich want reform since U ( r ; k r ; H ) > U p ; k r ; L > U p ; k r ; 1 .
Claim 26
In the absence of special interest groups, reform is always blocked.
Proof. It follows from equation (21) 
Therefore, in stage 3 of the game, the party of the poor always blocks reform.
Claim 27 When special interest groups arise, a) if U p ; k p ; L > U ( r ; k p ; H ), rich voters can bribe the party of the poor into supporting reform if there is a b <
H , rich voters can bribe the party of the poor into supporting reform if there is a b < U ( r ; k r ; H ) U ( p ; k r ; 1) such that
Proof. It follows from equation (21) that reform is always blocked in the absence of bribes to the party of the poor. Rich voters must therefore compensate the party of the poor into being indi¤erent between blocking reform and supporting it. In stage 4 of the game, the party of the poor gets elected when U p ; k p ; L > U ( r ; k r ; H ). For that reason, the party of the poor faces a loss of rich voters bribe the party of the poor into supporting if reform is suf…ciently valuable to make them better o¤ after compensating the party of the poor for its costs of implementing reform. When U p ; k p ; L U ( r ; k r ; H ) rich voters can bribe the party of the poor if the utility di¤erentials are su¢ -cient to compensate the party of the poor for …scal and electoral losses as well as implementation costs.
In the absence of bribes, the incentives for both parties are perfectly alligned with those of their constituencies. The incorporation of bribes can help the rich achieve its desired policy allowing the party of the poor to opportunistically overcome resistance to reform.
3.4.4
Case 3: The High E¢ ciency Party Represents the Poor, The Rich are Hurt by Reform Claim 28 Reform always fails and the party of the poor always wins the election.
Proof. The party of the poor always wins the election as
H ) c r so the party of the rich always blocks reform.
In this case, the incentives of rich voters and their party are perfectly alligned. Since the party has the ability to prevent reform from occurring, reform is blocked. It follows from the previous claim that the party of the rich can never win the election. Both the party of the rich and rich voters want reform since U ( p ; k p ; H ) > U ( p ; k p ; 1). Reform can be achieved if rich voters compensate the party of the poor into supporting reform.
Incorporating special interests biases outcomes in favor of the rich's preferred policies. Asymmetric distribution of costs of reform may induce opportunistic support for reform.
Proof. Omitted. It ‡oows from claims 23, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29 and remark 30.
Several interesting results emerge. Rent preservation reduces feasibility of reform dramatically. Special interest groups somewhat mitigates the problem by allowing the rich to compensate the party of the poor. On the other hand, special interest groups lead to opportunistic behavior in which reforms which hurt the majority are enacted. Another source of opportunism emerges as a result of a divorce between the interest of rich voters and the party of the rich. When reform is costly for the rich, but electorally advantageous for the party of the rich, it may choose to support a reform that hurts its constituency. Consequently, it is possible to observe a strategic alliance between rich voters and the party of the poor, who block a reform which bene…ts its constituents in exchange for a bribe from rich voters.
Summary of Results and Concluding Remarks
The main result of the paper is introduced in the benchmark: the existence of political competition can have a negative e¤ect on reform feasibility. As reform generates asymmetric electoral gains, electoral losers face incentives to block reform for electoral reasons. This result is shown under highly optimistic conditions for reform feasibility: in the absence of informational frictions or asymmetric economic costs. Several extensions are presented in order to check the robustness of results. As further restrictions are introduced into the model, the main result is strenghtened. Additionally, di¤erent mechanisms also a¤ect reform feasibility. The …rst extension relaxes the assumption of class advantage. As a result, political competition becomes …erce and opportunistic blocking of reform becomes more pervasive. In the second extension, logrolling is employed as a mechanism to mitigate electoral ine¢ ciencies by compensating electoral losers through …scal bene…ts: Logrolling reduces electoral ine¢ ciencies to some extent but cause a di¤erent problem. Potential electoral winners are tempted into logrolling institutional reform support in exchange for …scal concessions which may have a negative net e¤ect on their constituents, as long as these ensure electoral success. A third extension deals with informational asymmetries and shows that informational asymmetries between voters and parties can cause parties to either overstate or understate the expected bene…ts of reform, depending on which is electorally bene…cial for the party. This makes it dif…cult for voters to recognize opportunistic behavior. The last extension deals with rent preservation and the existence of special interests. Rent preservation makes reform unlikely, the existence of special interests biases reform towards reforms that help the rich and makes reforms that hurt the rich unlikely.
The combination of these factors explains why democratic transition in some Latin American and Eastern European countries has led to disappointing institutional advances. The In particular, it shows that important institutional reforms may be dramatically hard to achieve. The results presented in the model are consistent with the work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) in which democratization does not lead to big changes as elites make important investments in de facto power. This model shows that investments need not be large, as the combination of democratic checks and balances and political competition has a strong institutional status quo bias.
Another important contribution of the model its methodological emphasis. The literature which studies the political economy of reform and policymaking has made large process, in large part due to the usage of a pivotal decisionmaker, whose motivations a¤ect policy. By using the median voter theorem, this analysis has been applied to democratic regimes. Even when the median voter is not explicitly invoked, the threat of political competition a¤ects the policies chosen by an incumbent and thus generates predictions from the actions of a single player (e.g. Rodrik and Mukand 2005, Coate and Morris 1999) . This way of studying policymaking in democratic regimes can be unsatisfactory, however. Division of power and frequent electoral competition are the two bastions of modern democracy. Sensible models focusing on policymaking in democratic settings must incorporate these active interactions between competing political agents. This model breaks away from the tradition of a single political actor in order to study these interactions.
